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In this paper we examine the impact of subsidies granted at national and regional levels 
on a set of R&D employment variables and we specifically seek to identify the 
existence of additional effects of these public subsidies on the R&D human resources of 
firms. We begin by assessing the effects of public funds on private R&D expenditure 
and on the number of R&D employees, and then focus n the impact of these funds on 
the composition of human resources engaged in R&D classified by occupation and level 
of education.  
 
The data used are from the Spanish Technological Innovation Panel for the period 2006-
2011. To control for selection bias and endogeneity, a combination of non-parametric 
matching techniques are used. Our results show that R&D subsidies increase the 
number of R&D employees but no contemporaneous increase is found in the average 
level of qualification of R&D staff members in subsidized firms. Nevertheless, in the 
subsequent years there is a positive effect on the recruitment of PhD holders. The 
effects of public support are heterogeneous and are dependent on the source of the 
subsidy and the firms’ characteristics. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Governments use a broad mix of innovation policy tools to correct market failures. This 
public intervention is justified from a social point of view as a means of preventing 
underinvestment in R&D activities. However, the ultimate goal of this policy is 
concerned not simply with increasing private R&D exp nditure, but rather with 
boosting productivity, economic growth, employment a d welfare. 
 
R&D subsidies, together with tax incentives, have been broadly used as technology 
policy tools to correct market failures. Their implementation implies the use of public 
funds and consequently their impact has been assessed from various perspectives. Until 
recently, these evaluations have focused primarily on two criteria: the ability of 
subsidies to induce greater R&D expenditure (input additionality) and their ability to 
generate more innovative outputs (output additionalty).  
 
This paper aims to analyse the effects of public R&D subsidies to business R&D on the 
level of qualification of R&D employees. The human capital in firms’ R&D employees 
affects the capacity of the firms to generate new knowledge and to innovate. Public 
support may favour changes in the human resources of ubsidized firms. It can 
strengthen human capital and technological know-how r enhance technology 
management through the recruitment of personnel with specific skills and knowledge 
important for R&D projects. Georghiou and Clarysse (2006) argue that rather than 
simply increasing the number of employees, public funds should serve as an incentive 
to increase the level of qualification of R&D staff members, enabling firms to attract the 
skills that allow them to acquire competitive advantages.  
 
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, there are no evaluation studies of R&D 
subsidies that have assessed the effects of public support on the level of qualification of 
R&D employees. The lack of information regarding the skills of individual R&D 
workers (Thomson and Jensen, 2013) has prevented this kind of analysis being carried 
out. 
 
After assessing the effect of R&D subsidies granted in Spain on the number of R&D 
employees, we analyse the impact of subsidies on the be aviour of firms in terms of the 
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recruitment of highly qualified human resources. To detect these effects we examine the 
way in which R&D subsidies can affect the compositin of human resources engaged in 
R&D. First, we analyse occupation type and the respon ibilities of R&D personnel, 
distinguishing between researchers, technicians and auxiliary staff. Second, we consider 
their level of education, separating PhD holders, gaduates and engineers, those with 
short-cycle tertiary education and personnel with oer non-tertiary education. This 
analysis affords us a better understanding of the impact of these subsidies on the 
quantity and quality of R&D employees. It reveals the way in which subsidized firms 
allocate their additional funds to R&D projects as f r as their human resources are 
concerned. 
 
R&D subsidies are granted by public agencies operating at different levels of 
government and these may have different policy objectiv s (Afcha, 2011; Blanes and 
Busom, 2004). Consequently, it is important to distinguish between levels of 
government (Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014), since these public agencies may influence 
firms’ demands for specific types of R&D personnel to carry out their R&D projects, 
depending on the selection criteria of the agencies. We focus our analysis on national 
and regional R&D subsidies, which are the most important in Spain in terms of the 
number of recipient firms and budget. However, in the estimations, we control for other 
sources of public support including European R&D subsidies.  
 
The database used in this paper is that of the Spanish Technological Innovation Panel 
(PITEC) for the period 2006-2011. This database, built with the Spanish version of the 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS), provides information on the occupation and 
educational level of R&D workers, data rarely available at firm-level. With these data 
we are able to overcome limitations caused by the lack of information about the skills of 
individual R&D workers. Our estimations of the impacts of subsidies are carried out by 
combining two non-parametric matching techniques – the coarsened exact matching 
method (CEM) and the propensity score matching method (PSM). 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical 
framework and summarises the empirical evidence concerning R&D subsidies and their 
impact on R&D employment. Section 3 describes the dataset and the methodology used 
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in the evaluation approach. In section 4 we discuss the main results of the estimations 





2.1. Public subsidies and R&D employment  
 
In recent years the literature devoted to evaluating he impact of technology policy 
intervention has grown rapidly. This literature analyses the impact of policy tools on 
firms’ innovative performance indicators. The empirical evidence (David et al., 2000; 
García-Quevedo, 2004; Cerulli, 2010; Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014) has focused 
primarily on evaluating the impact of public funding on R&D inputs measured through 
R&D spending and R&D effort, and on R&D outputs such as patents, sales of new 
products or the number of new products and processes. 
 
Recent papers propose complementing measures of input a d output additionality with 
analyses of changes in firms’ behaviour attributable to public intervention. Falk (2007) 
finds that scope additionalities arise, in the form of more cooperation or more 
challenging R&D projects, when multiple policy interv ntions or continuous public 
support is provided. Autio et al. (2008) show that collaborative R&D programs, by 
enhancing the identification of subsidized firms with a community of practice, enhance 
learning outcomes in these firms. Similarly, Clarysse et al. (2009) shed some light on 
the organizational factors affecting input additionality. Specifically, their results point to 
the fact that companies reporting the highest learning outcomes also continue to invest 
in their absorptive capacity. Therefore they provide evidence of a strong correlation 
between input additionality and behavioural additionality.  
 
Numerous studies evaluating public intervention in technology policy analyse the 
impact of subsidies on private R&D expenditures. Although some of them examine the 
effects of subsidies on employment as a complementary indicator (Eshima, 2003; 
Lerner, 1999; Link and Scott, 2013; Wallsten, 2000), the number of studies explicitly 




Some studies (Goolsbee, 1998; Wolff and Reinthaler, 2008) use aggregate data to 
analyse the effect of subsidies on wages and on the number of employees. While 
Goolsbee’s (1998) conclusions support a crowding out effect, showing that public 
financing increases the remuneration of the R&D personnel already engaged in R&D 
activities, Wolff and Reinthaler’s (2008) findings show that R&D subsidies stimulate 
both variables positively although the effect is greater on R&D wage levels. 
 
Other papers use microdata to examine the effects of public subsidies on R&D 
employment directly. Falk (2006) evaluates the impact of public subsidies in Austria 
using the number of R&D workers as the dependent variable. Her results indicate that 
R&D subsidies have a small but significant effect on R&D employment. A 1% increase 
in public funds generates a 0.04% rise in R&D personnel. Piekkola (2007) reports 
positive effects for Finland in the proportion of R&D employees as well as productivity 
growth improvements in subsidized firms. These results coincide with those obtained by 
Ali-Yrkkö (2005), also for Finland, when analysing the impact of R&D subsidies and 
distinguishing between domestic employees, those working in Finland, and non-
domestic employees and R&D and non-R&D employees. Hi  results show that 
subsidies have a positive impact only in the case of domestic employees engaged in 
R&D activities.  
 
These studies capture the impact of subsidies on increases in the number of R&D 
employees. Yet the effect produced by subsidies on the composition of human resources 
engaged in these R&D activities has not, to date, be n analysed in detail.  
 
2.2. Public subsidies, R&D projects and human resources 
 
Human resources are a key component in innovation and economic growth processes, as 
well as a priority objective for technology policy. For instance Griffith et al. (2004) 
stress the importance of human capital for technical ch nge and innovation in OECD 
countries.  
 
Lundvall (2008) reports that higher levels of education allow sufficient competence for 
the assimilation of technological change to be acquired. This therefore increases the 
importance of university graduates, since individuals with higher levels of education 
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serve as a vehicle for the construction of innovative skills and learning capacity. These 
two elements are essential for taking advantage of technological opportunities. In 
addition the complexity and tacit nature of scientific knowledge implies high costs in 
terms of knowledge transfer and exploitation. The recruitment of PhDs may help to 
overcome these problems, providing better ties with universities and public research 
institutions (García-Quevedo et al., 2012) and act as a channel bringing the knowledge 
embodied in these graduates into industry (Stephan et l., 2004). 
 
Empirical approaches have identified a positive link between human resources and 
R&D and innovation from a variety of perspectives. Leiponen (2005) shows that there 
are significant complementarities between technical ski ls and innovation and that 
human capital is positively associated with innovative performance. Innovation policies 
need to take these interactions into account. Piva and Vivarelli (2009) conclude that 
there is a positive link between ex-ante available skills and R&D investment and that 
improvements in a firm’s manpower skills may be beneficial for its innovation 
strategies. D’Este et al. (2014) also report a positive relationship between human capital 
and innovation showing that a strong skill base has a significant impact by attenuating 
deterrents to innovation. 
 
The concept of behavioural additionality emphasizes th  role of human resources as a 
key component in any evaluation of the benefits derived from public policies. This 
perspective, grounded in resource-based theory, stresses the importance of unique, rare 
and hard to imitate resources for firms and hence the importance of taking policy impact 
into account in terms of quality improvements recorded among employees.  
 
Georghiou and Clarysse (2006) describe various mechanisms of public intervention that 
may change firms’ strategies. The effects of technology policy may result in the 
acquisition of higher levels of knowledge, the upgrading of skills and improvements in 
technology management, as well as changes in the scal and length of R&D projects. 
Clarysse et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence of the impact of subsidies on 
organizational learning and technology management. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, no previous study has examined the impact of subsidies on the composition 




R&D subsidies granted to promote the R&D projects of firms may have effects on the 
educational composition of their R&D staff and improve the quality of their human 
capital, even if they do not specifically have this a m. David et al. (2000) point out, 
following on from the work of Blank and Stigler (1957), that besides the direct effect on 
private R&D investment, there are other potential micro-level effects of publicly 
subsidized R&D activity such as possible learning and training improvements that 
acquaint the firm with the latest advances in scientif c and technological knowledge. 
 
In a model of firm-level investment in R&D (David et al., 2000), subsidies are expected 
to lower the marginal cost of R&D and stimulate current and even future R&D 
expenditure (Arqué-Castells, 2013; Lach, 2002; Takalo et al., 2013). A very important 
proportion of the cost of R&D projects is expenditure on R&D personnel (Goolsbee, 
1998; Hall, 2002). Therefore firms that receive public support may increase their R&D 
expenditure on personnel and undertake new R&D projects. Nevertheless public support 
is not expected to have any effect on the educationl qualifications of R&D staff if 
R&D projects are homogeneous and public subsidies ar  neutral in the sense that they 
are targeted towards supporting the same or very similar types of R&D projects that 
firms are already undertaking.  
 
However, public agencies use specific eligibility criteria in selecting which R&D 
projects to grant subsidies to. This allocation of subsidies may have an upgrading effect 
on the educational level required of the R&D staff that will carry out the subsidized 
R&D projects. In principle, the policy prescription a d objective of public agencies is to 
maximise social welfare and they should therefore di ct their R&D subsidies towards 
projects that have greater social benefits, frequently i  cooperation with public 
institutions (David et al., 2000; Jaffe, 2002).  
 
In European Union countries, public programs supporting private R&D have to comply 
with the rules of the Community framework for state id for research and development 
and innovation. This framework states that aid for R&D must lead to recipients 
changing their behaviour so that they increase their level of R&D activity and R&D 
projects take place that would not otherwise have be n carried out. These rules also 
favour basic research and establish higher aid intensiti s for industrial research than for 
experimental development. In addition, they consider t to be an important criterion to 
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demonstrate that public support has an incentive effect, increasing the scope of research 
so that more ambitious projects with a higher probability of achieving scientific or 
technological breakthroughs or projects that involve greater risk are undertaken. 
 
From the perspective of behavioural additionality scope effects are also an important 
dimension of the impact of R&D subsidies (Falk, 2007). The existence of scope effects 
means that new objectives are added to projects, includi g new research areas that are 
beyond the key competences of firms and that involve greater difficulties and new 
technology or research fields (Falk, 2007; Georghiu et., al., 2004; Wanzenböck et al., 
2013). If scope additionality takes place the search for knowledge leads to a firm 
enlarging its previous knowledge base, exploring new trajectories and different 
technology and research fields. In order to acquire this additional knowledge, firms may 
need to recruit R&D personnel with new skills. Firms conducting new R&D projects or 
interested in engaging in technology cooperation with other firms and research 
institutions, in fields of technology distant from their previous competence (Katila and 
Ahuja, 2002), may need to recruit new research personnel in order to gain expertise and 
enlarge their knowledge base.  
 
Recent contributions (Huergo and Trenado, 2010; Takalo et al., 2013) show that the 
degree of technical challenge and potential of an R&D project positively influences the 
likelihood of receiving public support. In addition, fostering cooperation with research 
institutions is a very frequent objective of public policy and a relevant factor in the 
eligibility criteria for R&D projects, as has been shown by empirical analysis 
(Czarnitzki et al., 2007; Huergo and Trenado, 2010) and also by the results of this paper 
(see Table A.2 in the Appendix).  
 
In synthesis, an important implication of the above discussion is that firms may need to 
increase their human capital and change the educational composition of their R&D staff 
to undertake publicly supported R&D projects that may have greater scientific and 
technological content and that need to be carried out in cooperation with research 
institutions. The hiring of PhDs by firms is positively related to the technological level 
of R&D projects and to the existence of R&D cooperation with universities and 
research institutions (García-Quevedo et al., 2012; Herrera and Nieto, 2015). Even in 
the event that there is some substitution between privately financed and government-
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funded R&D projects, an increase in the educational level of the R&D staff could occur 
if the projects that receive public subsidies require higher levels of human resource 
skills. 
 
Nevertheless, in order for public support to R&D projects to achieve these effects it is 
required that it is effectively oriented to this type of project. It may be the case that 
public agencies are under strong pressures to provide support for projects with a high 
probability of success and private marginal rate of return (David et al., 2000; Lach, 
2002). These projects could be financed by the firms themselves and do not require the 
educational level and qualifications of R&D staff to be upgraded. Furthermore, the 
magnitude of the additionality effect and the potential changes in the educational 
composition of the R&D staff are related to the elasticity of supply of research 
personnel. If the supply of qualified personnel is inelastic, public support to R&D may 
result in an increase in the cost of salaries (Goolsbee, 1998) and not in the number of 
employees or in changes in the R&D staff. In synthesis, although there are sufficient 
reasons to expect public subsidies to have a positive effect on the human capital level of 
R&D staff, empirical analyses are required to test his hypothesis and to estimate the 
magnitude of this potential effect.  
 
2.3. Effects of R&D subsidies provided by different levels of government 
 
Recent evaluations stress the importance of considering the different levels of 
government that intervene in technology policy, because they may well use R&D 
subsidies to target different policy goals (Afcha, 2011; Blanes and Busom, 2004; 
Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2014; Fernández-Ribas, 2009; García-Quevedo and Afcha, 
2009).  
 
At the country level, a distinction should be drawn between subsidies granted by central 
governments and those coming from regional governments. The rationale underpinning 
technology policy at the national level is the existence of market failures (OECD, 2008) 
and it therefore seeks to create incentives to enhance the level of investment in R&D. 
Various empirical studies (Antonelli and Crespi, 2013; Blanes and Busom, 2004; 
Hussinger, 2008) associate the objectives of nationl governments with the so-called 
“picking-the-winners” strategy which tends to focus it  efforts on strengthening 
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technological levels in medium-large firms that belong to high or medium-high 
technology sectors and that have projects requiring large amounts of private investment. 
For Spain, Blanes and Busom (2004) show that nationl a d regional R&D subsidies 
seek to fulfil different objectives. Firm size and human capital intensity play an 
important role in their concession at the national level where subsidies are oriented, in 
the main, towards promoting high level, commercially viable, technological projects. 
 
The participation of regional governments in innovation and technology policy has 
increased substantially over the last two decades. Initially, these interventions were also 
made with the aim of correcting market failures. More recently however regional 
interventions have been more closely concerned with correcting systemic failures. This 
perspective identifies other sources of failure that might hinder the smooth operation of 
innovation systems and constitute obstacles for the development and economic growth 
of a region. Indeed, institutions such as the OECD (2008) suggest that technology 
policy at the regional level could be more effective n solving problems associated with 
i) a lack of innovative capacity in regional firms, ii) rigidities that prevent the correct 
configuration of institutions; iii) network and coordination problems related to the 
interaction between agents in the innovation system; iv) a failure to adapt frameworks 
so as to regulate economic activities and; v) lock-in failures motivated by practices and 
behaviour inhibiting the adoption of new methods. 
 
The objectives of regional technology policy may thus differ from those adopted by 
national governments. In most regions in Spain they tend to be more closely oriented 
towards developing technological clusters, broadening the base of small and medium-
sized firms performing R&D activities and, more generally, towards reducing 
technological gaps between innovative and non-innovative firms. 
 
These differences in the technology policy goals of the two levels of government 
suggest that there may well also be differences in the impact of their respective 
subsidies on business R&D expenditures and employment. In Spain, national and 
regional agencies do not have the same criteria for selecting the R&D projects that are 
to receive subsidies (García-Quevedo and Afcha, 2009). In addition, the sizes of the 
subsidies are significantly different. In the period f analysis of this paper, 2006-2011, 
the average national subsidy was 176,092 euros while the average regional subsidy was 
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130,312 euros. Marzucchi and Montresor (2015) also show, in their analysis for Italy 
and Spain, that the impacts of the subsidies from these two levels of government are 
different. Therefore differences in impacts can be expected that may be especially 
marked in the case of R&D employment, the main characte istics of which tend to be 
specifically related to the type of project proposed by the firms that apply for grants 
from public agencies. 
 
 
3. Institutional framework, data and methodology 
3.1. Institutional framework: R&D and innovation policy in Spain 
 
Support to R&D projects in firms during the period f analysis 2006-2011 were, at a 
national level, carried out within the framework of the Spanish Plans for Scientific 
Research, Development and Technological Innovation for the periods 2004-2007 and 
2008-2011. These Plans are the basic programming mechanism of the Spanish system 
of R&D and innovation. They establish priorities, policy objectives and design the 
instruments to achieve them. The main objectives of the Plans for these two periods 
were to significantly increase the scientific and technological level of Spain, to promote 
the technological and innovation potential and competitiveness of firms, to enhance the 
relation between the public research system and private agents, to reinforce cooperation 
between national and regional levels, to strengthen t  international dimension of the 
Science and Technology (S&T) system, to provide a favourable climate for R&D 
investment and to provide favourable conditions for the promotion of scientific culture 
and the diffusion of S&T advances in society. These Plans had different programmes 
and instruments (European Commission, 2010). Althoug  the Spanish government is 
the main actor in R&D policy, most regional governments have their own innovation 
policies. In these policies, they also grant R&D subsidies to firms as a part of a strategy 
of reinforcing their respective regional innovation systems. 
  
In both the Spanish national and regional governments the promotion of R&D projects 
in firms through the granting of subsidies is mainly done through competitive calls and 
with an evaluation of the proposals of the firms. R&D subsidies are granted in these 
calls in a process similar to international procedur s (Jaffe, 2002; Takalo et al., 2013). 
First, an overall budget is allocated to the call for R&D subsidies. Second, firms apply 
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for subsidies by submitting a proposal for an R&D project. This application contains 
qualitative and quantitative information on both the firm and the R&D project itself. 
Third, in accordance with established and public crteria, experts evaluate the projects. 
The main criteria considered in the Spanish calls for this period that were the most 
important in quantitative terms (Herrera and Nieto, 2008) were the scientific and 
technological contribution of the R&D project, the socio-economic impact and 
cooperation with agents of the S&T system. Other criteria also considered were the 
feasibility of the project and the expected increase in R&D activities. Finally, a 
committee used this information to determine which projects would be granted a 
subsidy and the amount of that subsidy. 
 
3.2. Data description 
 
The data used in this study are taken from the Spanish Technological Innovation Panel 
(PITEC). This database is compiled for Spain by the National Statistics Institute (INE). 
This body is advised in this task by a group of university researchers and sponsored by 
the Spanish Foundation for Science and Technology (FECYT) and the COTEC 
Foundation. The panel database includes the annual S rvey of Innovation in 
Companies, carried out annually by the INE following the guidelines of the OECD’s 
Oslo Manual, which means it can be compared with similar European innovation 
surveys (Community Innovation Survey). The panel comprises 12,283 firms drawn 
from industrial and service sectors for the period 2003-2011. We limit our study to the 
period 2006-2011 given that some questions in the survey have changed over the years 
and some information is not available for the early years. The PITEC provides detailed 
information about R&D employment according to occupation and level of education or 
formal qualifications of R&D personnel. Its panel structure allows lagged variables to 
be included to control for previous performance andthe granting of subsidies so that 
potential persistency in the allocation of public funds can be taken into account. 
 
Occupation data are classified according to the crit ria proposed by the OECD (2002) in 
the Frascatti Manual, distinguishing between researchers, technicians and other support 
staff employed in R&D activities measured in full-time equivalent (FTE). Education 
data also adhere to OECD guidelines and include the following categories: PhD holders 
(ISCED level 6), Graduates or Engineers (ISCED level 5a), Short-cycle tertiary (ISCED 
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level 5b) and personnel with non-tertiary education (ISCED level 4 or below). Although 
a new version of the International Standard Classificat on of Education was published in 
2011, we use the categories from the 1997 version as these are used in the PITEC in the 
period 2006-2011. 
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of R&D personnel classified by occupation and level of 
education. By occupation, researchers constitute the main group followed by technicians 
and auxiliary staff in R&D. By level of education, graduates and engineers are the most 
numerous group followed by personnel with non-tertiary education, those with short-
cycle tertiary and, finally, PhD holders. The number of PhD holders in firms in Spain is 
below the respective OECD and EU averages (Cruz-Castro nd Sanz-Menéndez, 2005) 
but their number has tended to increase in recent years.  
 




The evaluation of technology policy has evolved rapidly in recent years and traditional 
problems in the evaluation of R&D subsidies such as sample selection and endogeneity 
have been broadly analysed in the empirical literature (Cerulli, 2010). The first of these 
problems, sample selection, arises because it is only possible to observe the 
performance of those firms participating and obtaining public subsidies. The second 
problem is that the variables used to measure the effect of public intervention (e.g. 
private effort in R&D) could be endogenously determined if we assume that firms 
making a greater effort in R&D are more likely to be subsidized. 
 
Most recent studies use non-parametric matching techniques to solve these problems. 
Propensity score matching (PSM), as a matching method for the estimation of the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), has been used extensively in empirical 
studies of the effects of R&D subsidies (see, among thers, Aerts and Schmidt; 2008; 
Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Carboni, 2011; Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006; Czarnitzki and 
Lopes Bento, 2013; Duch et al. 2009; Duguet, 2004; González and Pazó, 2008; Herrera 




We also use non-parametric techniques. We combine two matching techniques in order 
to ensure the maximum degree of similarity between co trol and treated groups. The 
first technique is coarsened exact matching (CEM) as proposed by Blackwell et al. 
(2009) and the second is PSM as proposed initially by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
Using CEM before the implementation of the subsequent matching technique is 
suggested as an appropriate procedure that improves the quality of matching and the 
inferences drawn after PSM (Blackwell et al., 2009; Iacus et al., 2011). 
 
Matching techniques allow the comparison of two potential results, W1 for those firms 
receiving the subsidy, D=1, and W0 for those firms not receiving any treatment (D=0). 
Matching is based on the conditional independence assumption (CIA), which states that, 
conditional on a vector of covariates, potential outc mes W1 and W0 are independent of 
D. In order to ensure the fulfilment of this assumption it is necessary to observe those 
variables that simultaneously affect the outcome and the reception of the treatment 
exhaustively. 
 
The wealth of information provided by the PITEC allows an exhaustive set of variables 
to be selected and similar controls to be included as those used in previous evaluation 
studies (see, among others, Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; 
Antonelli and Crespi, 2013; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013; Czarnitzki and Lopes-
Bento, 2014; González and Pazó, 2008; Hussinger, 2008).  
 
We consider three different types of variables. First, we control for the experience of 
firms of obtaining subsidies in previous periods or fr m other levels of government. The 
experience gained in past and current applications seems to be valuable for subsequent 
applications, which underlines both the importance of the learning process and the 
persistence of R&D activities (Antonelli and Crespi, 2013; González and Pazó, 2008). 
Taking advantage of the panel data structure, we include a lagged variable to control for 
persistence in obtaining subsidies, as has been done in other papers that use the same 
methodology (Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013; Duguet, 2004; González and Pazó, 
2008). In addition, receiving subsidies from other agencies - regional, national or 
European - may also have influence on obtaining subsidies from a specific government 
level. We therefore control for subsidies granted by other levels of government when 




Second, we include a large number of variables regarding the R&D activities of firms 
and their characteristics. Most of these variables ar  considered in the year previous to 
the granting of the subsidy to minimise possible endogeneity concerns and also to 
control for the path dependence associated with the innovation process. These variables 
are whether the firm performs internal R&D, the characteristics of the R&D staff 
according to their occupational level, and the number of patents applied for. All these 
variables control for the degree of engagement in R&D activities and for innovation 
potential. These may be important in making the firm eligible to receive subsidies. In 
this group of variables we also include whether thefirm has engaged in R&D 
cooperation, a criterion that is usually taken into account in granting subsidies. R&D 
cooperation may increase the likelihood of receiving public support because of the 
importance that technology policy at different levels of government gives to reinforcing 
relationships between the different agents of the innovation system. As a proxy for the 
existence of financial constraints we also use, in a similar way to Aerts and Schmidt 
(2008), a four-point-Likert-scale reflecting whether the firm considers the lack of funds 
within the firm to be an important factor hampering i novation activities. Finally, we 
include a proxy for the training activities of the firms because of possible 
complementarities between human capital and innovation. 
 
Third, we include a large number of variables related to the characteristics of firms that 
the literature shows may influence receiving a subsidy and the R&D activities and 
outcomes of firms. Specifically, we use the following characteristics. We include size 
measured in terms of employees. Because one of the main outcomes to estimate is the 
effect on R&D employment we have considered total employees less R&D employees. 
Size may affect the likelihood of receiving a subsidy although according to different 
criteria with central or regional governments. While being a large firm may increase the 
likelihood of receiving central government subsidies, regional subsidies may be more 
oriented towards small and medium-sized firms. Second, we include the age of the firm. 
Public policy may be more oriented towards supporting R&D projects in start-ups or 
young firms. Nevertheless, the expected result is inconclusive because older firms are 
more likely to have better knowledge about public support and about different funding 
alternatives (Huergo and Trenado, 2010). Third, we include exports to control for the 
possible relationship between innovative and exporting activities, and also because this 
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can influence the decision of the agency, which may w nt to reinforce the competitive 
position of those firms that participate in international markets.  
 
We also include some characteristics of the firm related to organisation and ownership. 
We control for whether the firm belongs to a group and if there is foreign capital 
participation. As Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014) point out, agencies may favour 
firms that are part of a group because they are more likely to benefit from potential 
spillovers. In addition, firms belonging to groups may have more information about 
public calls and better funding resources (Antonelli and Crespi, 2013). On the other 
hand foreign ownership might have a negative influece on the probability of receiving 
R&D subsidies because country level public support may be more directed towards 
promoting domestic investments in R&D. In addition we take sector heterogeneity into 
account with dummies to control for differences in technological content. Public 
support may favour, in a “picking-the-winners” strategy, high-tech manufacturing or 
services firms. However, regional subsidies may be more oriented towards traditional 
manufacturing activities in order to regenerate low and medium-low technology 
companies. Finally, we take the geographic location of the firm into account and we 
include, using all the information available in the PITEC, dummies for the three biggest 
Spanish regions (Andalusia, Catalonia and Madrid) to control for specific regional 
factors that may affect the likelihood of receiving a subsidy and the outcomes. 
 
In order to guarantee the similarity between treated nd control groups, the first method 
used is the CEM, which allows covariates to be matched exactly. The main advantage of 
CEM over other matching methods is that the maximum imbalance of the empirical 
distribution is bounded through an ex-ante user choice. By choosing this imbalance ex-
ante, users can control the amount of imbalance in the matching solution. By so doing 
this method improves the estimation of causal effects and reduces differences between 
treated and control groups (Collins et al., 2011; Finseraas et al., 2011; Mason et al., 
2011).  
 
By combining CEM with other matching methods, it is possible to improve the 
estimates in several ways, such as reducing variance or removing heterogeneity. 
Furthermore, CEM has two main benefits. It meets the congruence principle and it 
restricts the matched data to areas of common empirical support (Iacus et al., 2011). 
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Finally, matching methods inherit many of the CEM properties when applied to further 
matching data pre-processed by the CEM method (Blackwell et al, 2009).  
 
CEM generates intervals for each variable submitted for comparison, coarsening 
observations into different subgroups. After coarsening each variable into substantively 
meaningful groups, the exact matching algorithm is applied to the coarsened data, and 
the values of the matched data are retained uncoarsened. 
 
The measure of imbalance in CEM is obtained using this formula: 
 
      (1) 
 
where   and  are relative frequencies of the discretized variables X1...Xk, for 
the treated and control units respectively.  
 
The data for the period 2006-2011 are treated as pooled data; thus observations for the 
same firm in different years are considered as independent observations. After 
discarding variables with missing values, CEM is run, providing a sample of treated and 
control firms, matched exactly for a set of variables. The next step involves the use of a 
second matching method, in this case propensity score matching (PSM), on the sample 
previously matched with CEM. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) define the PSM as the 
conditional probability of being treated given a vector of covariates X: 
 
( ) ( 1 ) ( )p X P D X E D X≡ = =
       
(2)  
 
where D is a dummy variable indicating the exposure to the treatment that takes values 
D= (0,1). Then, ATT is formulated as follows:  
 
{ }( ) 1 (1) 1, ( ) (0) 0, ( )p x D E Y D P X E Y D P Xτ = = = − =          (3)  
 
where: 
Y(1) represents the expected outcome for subsidized firms. 
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Y(0) represents the outcome for non-subsidized firms. 
 
The nearest neighbour matching (NNM) algorithm is used to construct the treatment 
and control groups. The two nearest neighbours for each subsidized firm, restricted to 
common support, are obtained. The set of variables used in the matching procedure, 
CEM and PSM, are described in Table A.1. 
 
4. Results  
4.1. Determinants of the probability of receiving an R&D subsidy 
 
The results of the probit estimations, carried out after the CEM (Appendix, Table A.2), 
regarding the determinants of a firm receiving a subsidy are consistent with the 
literature. The results also show that there are some differences between the variables 
influencing the probability of receiving national or regional subsidies, although most 
results are similar for both subsidies. First, the variables corresponding to a firm’s 
experience in obtaining subsidies in previous periods play a key role in obtaining public 
funds. To receive subsidies from other public agencies also has an important influence.  
 
Second, the variables for the R&D activities category show that previous internal R&D 
has a positive influence on obtaining subsidies, a result confirming the persistency of 
R&D and that public support favours firms that alredy perform R&D. R&D 
cooperation significantly increases the likelihood of receiving public support in all the 
estimations. This result underlines the fact that te purpose of technology policy is to 
reinforce relationships between the agents of the innovation system. Public support is 
also more oriented towards firms with existing technology activities as is shown by the 
positive and statistically significant parameter coresponding to patents.  
 
Finally, the variables related to the characteristics of firms show that size, age, to form 
part of a group and to be an exporter increase the likelihood of receiving a subsidy. 
However public support does not seem to particularly favour high-tech manufacturing 
firms. The results also reveal some differences betwe n national and regional subsidies. 
 




The validity of the matching is a crucial step in applying these techniques and the main 
objective is to determine the similarity of the joint distribution of the set of covariates 
corresponding to the control and treated groups (Stuart, 2010). A common procedure to 
confirm that both groups are properly balanced involves estimating the standardized 
bias or the difference in standardized means, before and after matching (LaLonde, 1986; 
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
 
        (4) 
 
Table A.3 in the appendix shows, for each variable, th  reduction in bias achieved in the 
differences between treated and controls after the second matching procedure (PSM). 
The mean values for these variables do not present ig ificant differences between 
controls and treated groups receiving national, regional or total public funding for R&D. 
 
4.3. Impact of R&D subsidies 
 
Table 2 shows the results corresponding to the effect of public subsidies for R&D 
activities, without distinguishing between the levels of government. These results 
correspond to different categories of R&D expenditures and number of R&D employees 
classified by type of occupation and level of education. In these estimations, the effects 
on the different outcomes are estimated for the same year as the granting of the subsidy. 
 
In line with previous studies for Spain (Busom, 2000; González and Pazó, 2008; 
González et al., 2005; Herrera and Heijs, 2007), these results reveal the existence of 
financial additionality in private R&D expenditures. The estimations also show that 
public subsidies have a positive and significant effect on the number of R&D 
employees. Public subsidies afford firms the possibility of increasing their stock of 
human capital and of allocating it to R&D projects. This is something that, according to 
the empirical literature, will have positive effects on a firm’s productivity and 
innovative performance. 
 
Our data allow us to examine not only the magnitude of the increase in the number of 
R&D employees but also to analyse the behaviour of subsidized firms taking certain 
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characteristics of their R&D staff, such as occupation and educational level, into 
account. This level of observation enables us to examine changes in the internal 
structure of the firm and to analyse whether the subsidy induces changes in these two 
dimensions of R&D human resources. 
 
By occupation, the increase in the overall size of R&D staff induced by subsidies leads 
to increases in each of the three categories (i.e.,researchers, technicians and auxiliary 
personnel), although the greatest growth is recorded in the number of researchers. By 
level of education, the increase in R&D personnel is mainly in the number of graduates 
followed by personnel with other non-tertiary and short cycle tertiary studies and, 
finally, PhD holders.  
 
     Table 2 
 
To examine whether these increases in the different categories of R&D employees lead 
to an improvement of the average level of human capital we compare the structure of 
the R&D staff in the treated and control firms by both occupation and qualification. The 
results (Appendix, Table A.4) do not reveal the existence of a greater proportion of 
highly qualified personnel in treated firms. Thus, for example, the percentages of 
researchers among R&D staff are 47.4% and 55.9% for treated and control firms 
respectively. Similarly, while 4.2% of the R&D staff hold PhDs in the treated firms, this 
percentage is 5.5% in the controls. These results show that subsidies generate an 
increase in R&D expenditures and an increase in R&D staff numbers, but that they do 
not bring about changes in the composition of R&D personnel in the same year as when 
the subsidy is received.  
 
Nevertheless public subsidies may have long-term effects distributed over several years. 
It takes time to implement R&D activities and for their benefits to show. In addition 
R&D support programmes may be targeted more at medium and long-term objectives 
(Cerulli, 2010; Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014). To recruit but also to fire R&D personnel, 
particularly highly qualified personnel, may imply high adjustment costs for the firms. 
In addition, once a firm hires a PhD holder for a subsidized R&D project, it may retain 
the PhD for later years. After hiring a PhD, a firm will have better information on their 
contribution to its research activities (García-Quevedo et al., 2012) and these highly 
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qualified personnel will also have acquired firm-specific knowledge. Therefore the 
short-term and long-term effects of public subsidies on R&D employment may differ. 
 
To examine potential effects in the years after receiving a subsidy we took advantage of 
our longitudinal data and we estimated the impact of receiving a subsidy in the year t on 
the outcome variables for the next two years, t+1 and t+2. In these estimations we used 
the same control variables as previously but we also controlled for receiving a subsidy 
in t+1 and t+2. The purpose of this is to attribute to the treatment, receiving a subsidy in 
the year t, the effects for the two subsequent years, in the most precise way possible. 
Nevertheless, some caution is necessary because of the difficulties in controlling 
properly for all the variables that may affect the outcomes of t+1 and t+2. Although we 
were controlling for subsidies in t+1 and t+2, other variables may not have remained 
invariant throughout this period of time, and this would influence the outcome 
variables.  
 
The results (Table 3) show that the effects of public subsidies go beyond the year of 
treatment. However these impacts diminish through time both in quantitative terms and 
in significance. The results regarding changes in the R&D staff provide evidence that 
the treatment in year t has a positive and significant effect on total personnel in R&D, 
on researchers and PhD holders in the next year, t+1, while for the year t+2 the only 
positive effect to be found is in the recruitment of PhD holders. These results suggest 
that public subsidies may have medium-term effects and help to improve the average 
level of qualification of R&D staff, particularly regarding the employment of PhD 
holders. The comparison of the structures of R&D staff by occupation and qualification 
in treated and control firms (Appendix, Table A.5) shows that for the subsequent years, 
t+1 and t+2, the proportion of PhD holders among R&D staff is notably greater in 
treated firms than in control firms. In the year t+1, 5.3% of the R&D staff in the treated 
firms holds a PhD, while in control firms the proporti n is 3.1% (7.9% and 3.2% 
respectively in year t+2)   
 
     Table 3 
 
As shown by recent empirical literature and its growing interest in analysing possible 
heterogeneous effects, the impact of public financing may differ depending on the 
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firms’ characteristics. This heterogeneity suggests that a firm’s reaction to public 
intervention may be conditioned by specific characteris ics that influence the innovation 
process. Several papers analyse the impact of R&D subsidies on firms according to their 
size (Falk, 2007; González and Pazó, 2008; Lach, 2002; Ösçelik and Taymaz, 2008). In 
this paper, the possible existence of differences attributable to firm size is also analysed. 
Additionally, we take the type of R&D performed into account, whether it is continuous 
or occasional in nature.  
 
R&D subsidies are mainly granted to solve market failures and financial market 
imperfections that hamper access to finance for R&D projects. These failures primarily 
affect those firms that face difficulties in meeting the financial costs of R&D projects. 
Therefore differences in the impacts of public subsidie  on small and medium-sized 
firms, on the one hand, and on large firms, on the other, are to be expected, since the 
latter a priori face fewer financial restrictions and are less dependent on public funding. 
In order to test this hypothesis, ATT was estimated by splitting the sample into two 
groups, firms with 250 employees or less and firms with more than 250 employees 
(Table 2). 
 
The results show, first, that there are financial additionality effects of R&D subsidies for 
both types of firm and for all categories of R&D exp nditure. Second, R&D subsidies 
have a significant impact on the number of R&D employees. Third, there is an increase 
in all categories of R&D employees, by occupation and or level of education, in both 
types of firm. Therefore, even in small and medium-sized firms, the granting of R&D 
subsidies leads to the recruitment of graduates and PhD holders. 
 
With the aim of analysing the impact of public financing on firms performing R&D on a 
regular basis compared with those firms performing occasional R&D, ATT was 
estimated considering the frequency of R&D activities. While firms that perform R&D 
on a regular basis have, in general, long-term R&D strategies and stable R&D staffs, 
occasional performers do not, in many cases, have a formal R&D organisation. 
Different effects of public financing are expected in relation to differences in the 
qualifications held by staff members in both types of firm and also to the characteristics 




The results show an additional effect of public subsidies on R&D expenditures and an 
increase in the number of R&D personnel in the two ypes of firm. The growth in the 
overall size of R&D staff attributable to a subsidy leads to an increase in each of the 
three categories of occupation in both cases. Neverthel ss, by level of education, there is 
no statistically significant impact on the recruitment of PhD holders for firms 
performing R&D on a regular basis. In contrast, our results show that for firms 
performing occasional R&D, public subsidies have a positive effect on the level of 
education of their R&D staff with a rise in the number of PhDs recruited and significant 
differences in the participation of PhD holders in the structure of the R&D staffs of 
treated and control firms. This result suggests that occasional R&D performers face 
human capital shortcomings when seeking to carry out new R&D projects and that the 
subsidies granted to these firms have additional effects by increasing the average level 
of education. 
  
4.4. Impact of subsidies according to different levels of government. 
 
Previous analyses indicate, as discussed above, that technology policies implemented at 
different levels of government correspond to different motivations. Table 4 shows the 
impact according to national and regional levels of public financing. Calls for 
applications for public subsidies from a specific level of government do not exclude 
firms already being subsidized by other levels of gvernment. Consequently in a given 
year a firm can receive public subsidies from more than one source. To take this into 
account, ATT was calculated for each level of government, controlling for the 
possibility that subsidies may have been obtained from other public agencies. In 
addition Table 4 also shows the ATT estimation for those firms receiving just one 
subsidy in a given year, i.e. only national or only regional.  
 
The results show that public financing (both national and regional subsidies) has a 
positive effect on the number of employees; however, the magnitude of this effect is 
greater in the case of national subsidies. The respective quantitative impacts on the 
different categories of R&D staff by level of education in subsidized firms also differ 
significantly. National subsidies have a greater effect on the recruitment of employees 
holding PhDs than regional subsidies and for the firms that receive only regional 




These results are consistent with the different objectives targeted by national and 
regional agencies respectively. Spain’s national government seems to adopt a “picking-
the-winners” strategy, promoting R&D and high-technology projects that require 
qualified personnel. In contrast most regional governments show a greater concern for 
promoting innovation (but not exclusively R&D) and for improving the links between 
the agents in their regional systems. Nevertheless, the recruitment of PhD holders 
attributable to national subsidies and the relative R&D staff structures of treated and 
control firms do not present any significant differences in the short-term. These results 
therefore seem to confirm those obtained for total subsidies indicating that R&D 
subsidies do not generate additional effects in terms of the average level of qualification 
of R&D staff.  
 
     Table 4 
 
4.5. Robustness checks 
 
In order to verify the robustness of our estimations a d results we have carried out two 
complementary analyses regarding estimation procedures and a “placebo” test with a 
different definition of the dependent variable.  
 
The first robustness check concerns the matching procedure and the selection of the 
observations for the control group. In our analysis we have restricted the matching to 
firms in the same year. With this procedure we are abl  to control for annual changes in 
cyclical behaviour, financial conditions, and fiscal policies among other things. These 
are areas in which change was very intense in Spain duri g this period. In addition, it 
also allows possible changes in R&D subsidy policies during these years to be 
controlled for. All of these are non-observable factors that may affect the likelihood of 
being granted a subsidy and the outcome. However, with this procedure we missed the 
fact that in the matching estimations a firm in a different year acts as its own control 
observation if its support status has changed. For sh t periods of time, the same firm 
may behave as a proper control because it helps to consider non-observable factors such 
as management quality that may be similar when comparing near time spans. To take 
this possibility into account we have carried out the estimations without imposing the 
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condition that the matching is restricted to firms in the same year. The results for total 
subsidies (Appendix, Table A.6) are, both in significance and in quantitative values, 
very similar to those of the main estimation and lead to the same conclusions regarding 
the additional effects of R&D subsidies and changes in human resources. 
 
Second, in the main estimations we have considered non-parametric matching to be the 
most suitable approach due to the characteristics of our data. To guarantee the quality of 
the matching we have used CEM and PSM methods and a large number of relevant 
control variables to correct for selection bias. One general limitation of this method is 
that it only controls for the selection on observables. The availability of panel data 
offers, a priori, the possibility of using a diff-in-diff estimator. However the lack of 
information regarding the length of each project and the existence of multiple treatments 
with concessions that follow irregular trajectories over time hinders the establishment of 
a baseline year without loss of data and an appropriate application of a diff-in-diff 
estimator turns out to be very difficult (Czarnitzki et al., 2011). We also faced, like 
Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014), the limitation that quite a large percentage of the 
firms were only observed once in the sample or were not observed in two consecutive 
periods. In addition, those firms receiving public funds every year from either national 
or regional governments are discarded in diff-in-diff estimations. A necessary condition 
to be met in order to perform a diff-in-diff analysis is that the firms have not received a 
subsidy in at least one year. Considering their R&D performance, these discarded firms 
would be, presumably, one of the main targets of R&D policy. Therefore using a diff-
in-diff estimator implies a considerable loss of observations, 30.8% of our sample, and 
of information in analysing the effects of R&D subsidies. Despite these limitations we 
carried out a diff-in-diff estimation, following the same procedure as Lach (2002) to 
pool the data. The results (Appendix, Table A.7) are consistent with our main results 
and again suggest that our findings are robust.  
 
Finally, in the third robustness check we carried out a “placebo” test. Our hypothesis is 
that public subsidies addressed to promoting the R&D activities of firms should have an 
additional effect on R&D expenditure and on R&D employment but not on non-R&D 
employment, at least in the short-term. The results (Appendix, Table A.8) confirm this 
hypothesis and show that the effects of R&D subsidie  on non-R&D employment are 
not significant. These results also reinforce the validity of our estimations and the 
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conclusions regarding the causal relationship betwen public subsidies and R&D 




In this paper we have analysed the impact of public subsidies on the composition of 
R&D employment. Despite R&D employment being a priority objective in technology 
policy, few studies explicitly examine this relationship. After confirming that subsidies 
increase both total and private R&D expenditures, our estimations show that public 
support has a positive effect on the number of R&D employees. However, our results do 
not identify the existence of behavioural additionality effects in the short-term. The 
increase in the size of the R&D staffs of subsidize firms does not lead to an 
improvement in the average level of qualification of the staff members in the same year 
as the subsidy is received. Nevertheless, there are positive effects on the recruitment of 
PhD holders in the years after receiving the subsidy. 
 
Our results show that when evaluating the impact of R&D subsidies it is necessary to 
consider the multilevel structure of governments involved in the granting of subsidies. 
Indeed, our findings point to differences depending o  the level of government. At the 
two levels considered - national and regional - subsidies have a positive effect on the 
number of R&D employees but in the case of firms that only receive regional subsidies 
there is no significant effect on the recruitment of PhDs.  
 
The analysis carried out is not free of limitations. First, as in most studies of this kind, 
information about the specific characteristics of the projects actually being funded is not 
available. Second, it is not possible to distinguish between subsidies granted by the 
various regional agencies that may have quite distinct innovation policy objectives. 
Third, the time period for which information is available is too short for a detailed 
examination of the potential long-term effects regading changes in the wages and in the 
supply of highly qualified personnel such as PhD holders.  
 
Despite these limitations, this analysis has provided information about the effects of 
technology policy. First, it confirms the existence of financial additionality as regards 
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R&D expenditures and employees. Second, the results do not show that R&D subsidies 
lead to significant changes in the composition of R&D staff in subsidized firms and they 
rule out the existence of additional effects on the level of education of R&D personnel 
in the same year as receiving the subsidy. Third, the analysis carried out shows the 
importance, as Cerulli (2010) and Zúñiga-Vicente et al., (2014) point out, of analysing 
the impact of public subsidies not only in the short-te m but also in the medium and 
long-term. Our results for the educational compositi n of R&D personnel suggest that 
the subsidies have positive effects on the proportion of PhD holders in the R&D staff of 
a firm in the years after the granting of a subsidy. Finally, our results show that R&D 
subsidies have no effect on non-R&D employment, at least in the short-term. This result 
confirms, first, the effectiveness of R&D policy infostering the recruitment of highly 
qualified employees devoted to R&D activities, and second allows us to rule out a 
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Table 1. R&D personnel by occupation and level of education (data in full-time equivalent, FTE) 
 Occupation Education 
Year Researchers Technicians Auxiliary 
staff 









(10444)* 2.51 2.03 0.86 5.40 0.31 2.57 1.21 1.31 5.40 
2007 
(10479)* 2.56 2.10 0.83 5.50 0.36 2.62 1.17 1.35 5.50 
2008 
(10421)* 2.64 2.16 0.81 5.61 0.40 2.69 1.19 1.33 5.61 
2009 
(10427)* 2.74 2.20 0.78 5.71 0.39 2.80 1.20 1.32 5.71 
2010 
(10014)* 2.79 2.37 0.76 5.91 0.43 3.05 1.14 1.30 5.91 
2011 
(9619)* 2.74 2.27 0.76 5.77 0.44 2.87 1.17 1.28 5.77 
Total 
(61404)* 2.66 2.19 0.80 5.65 0.39 2.76 1.18 1.32 5.65 
Note: Mean values at firm-level. * Number of observations. 
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Table 2. Impact of R&D subsidies. Subsidies from any public administration.  
  Total 250 employees or 
less 
More than 250 employees Continuous R&D performers Occasional R&D performers 
Variable Difference T-stat Difference T-stat Difference T-stat Difference T-stat Difference T-stat 
Total R&D expenditures 85088.77 12.23*** 62422.49 7.86***  296172.73 5.30***  99420.38 5.74***  83328.21 6.86***  
Private R&D expenditures 69691.25 8.42***  53454.74 6.05***  247372.25 4.01***  29715.48 1.60 67307.30 5.21***  
Internal R&D expenditures  60981.80 12.17*** 44027.77 8.62***  224180.51 5.40***  77303.47 4.72***  56804.77 6.74***  
Total personnel in R&D 0.81 14.23*** 0.63 8.97***  3.78 4.79***  1.18 6.65***  0.83 8.28***  
Research personnel  0.32 10.63*** 0.27 7.23***  1.71 4.76***  0.54 5.28***  0.40 7.27***  
Technicians  0.31 10.79*** 0.23 6.61***  1.72 3.46***  0.42 4.54***  0.27 6.36***  
Auxiliary staff  0.16 9.43***  0.12 6.08***  0.34 2.98***  0.22 3.53***  0.15 5.63***  
PhDs  0.02 3.09***  0.02 2.47***  0.10 3.28***  0.03 1.06 0.02 2.44***  
Graduates  0.44 2.83***  0.29 7.79***  2.21 4.69***  0.64 6.22***  0.44 6.55***  
Short cycle tertiary  0.15 8.22***  0.12 5.26***  0.95 3.13***  0.27 3.91***  0.16 6.09***  
Non-university degree  0.19 7.92***  0.18 5.43***  0.50 3.34***  0.22 2.57***  0.20 6.21***  
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. R&D expenditures are expressed in Euros and personnel in FTE.   
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Table 3. Impact of R&D subsidies in the years t+1 and t+2. Subsidies from any public 
administration 
 Total. Year t+1 Total. Year t+2 
Variable Difference T-stat Difference T-stat 
Total R&D expenditures 45076.26 1.90* 35081.05 1.77* 
Private R&D expenditures  40374.51 1.79* 29901.54 1.55 
Internal R&D expenditures 19721.46 1.10 12763.71 1.20 
Total personnel in R&D  0.24 2.37***  0.07 0.52 
Research personnel  0.12 1.97** -0.01 0.13 
Technicians  0.07 1.53 0.04 0.47 
Auxiliary staff  0.04 1.53 0.04 1.11 
PhDs  0.03 2.47***  0.04 2.34** 
Graduates  0.12 2.15** 0.00 0.00 
Short cycle tertiary  0.05 1.62 0.00 0.03 
Non-university degree  0.04 0.92 0.02 0.34 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. R&D expenditures 
are expressed in Euros and personnel in FTE. In addition to the covariates used in the previous 
estimations (see Table A.1 for the list of variables), treatment in t+1 and treatment in t+2 are included in 




Table 4. Impact of R&D subsidies by level of government 




Only National R&D 
subsidies 
Only Regional R&D 
subsidies 
Variable Difference T-stat Difference T-stat Difference T-stat Difference T-stat 
Total R&D 
expenditures 
118560.98 6.80***  68157.74 4.75***  136504.77 8.30***  59576.36 7.19***  
Private R&D 
expenditures  
101017.09 5.20***  39090.18 5.06***  96327.97 6.57***  48639.07 5.27***  
Internal R&D 
expenditures 




1.40 6.60***  0.55 7.33***  1.71 8.82***  0.62 8.45***  
Research 
personnel  
0.54 7.13***  0.26 5.86***  0.62 7.07***  0.24 5.85***  
Technicians  0.61 4.55***  0.19 6.18***  0.79 6.65***  0.22 6.71***  
Auxiliary staff  0.24 5.05***  0.09 4.28***  0.29 5.38***  0.14 5.60***  
PhDs  0.07 3.60***  0.02 1.77* 0.08 3.25***  0.003 0.57 
Graduates  0.78 7.10***  0.28 6.88***  0.84 6.85***  0.30 6.88***  
Short cycle 
tertiary  




0.28 4.66***  0.12 3.67***  0.40 6.01***  0.16 4.90***  
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. R&D expenditures 
are expressed in Euros and personnel in FTE. Dummy variables for subsidies from the European Union 
(EU) and regional governments are included in the estimation of the impact of national R&D subsidies. 
Dummy variables for subsidies from EU and national government are included in the estimation of the 
impact of regional subsidies. 
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Table A.1. Data description 
Variable Description Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
National subsidies 
Dummy=1 if the firm receives national subsidies, 0 otherwise 61404 0.18 0.39 
Regional subsidies 
Dummy=1 if the firm receives regional subsidies, 0 otherwise 61404 0.19 0.39 
European subsidies 
Dummy=1 if the firm receives European subsidies, 0 
otherwise 
61404 0.04 0.20 
Total subsidies in t-1 
Dummy=1 if the firm receives subsidies from some 
administration in the previous year, 0 otherwise 
61404 0.32 0.46 
Internal R&D in t-1 
Dummy=1 if the firm performs internal R&D activities in the 
previous year, 0 otherwise 
61404 0.51 0.50 
Patents 
Dummy=1 if the firm applies for patents, 0 otherwise 61404 0.10 0.30 
Training 
Dummy=1 if the firm imparts training courses to its workers, 0 
otherwise 
61404 0.11 0.31 
Foreign 
Dummy=1 for firms with 50% or more of foreign capital, 0 
otherwise 
61404 0.13 0.33 
Lack of internal funds in t-1 
Categorical variable between 1 (not experienced) to 4 (high 
importance) regarding the firm’s assessment of the lack of 
internal funds as a factor hampering innovation activities 
61404 2.35 1.13 
Group 
Dummy=1 if the firm belongs to a group, 0 otherwise 61404 0.40 0.49 
Size non-R&D  
Total number of non-R&D employees  61404 302.18 1452.01 
R&D cooperation in t-1 
Dummy=1 if the firm engages in R&D cooperation, 0 
otherwise 
61404 0.20 0.40 
High technology 
Dummy=1 if the firm belongs to high technology 
manufacturing sector, 0 otherwise 
61404 0.05 0.21 
Medium-high technology 
Dummy=1 if the firm belongs to medium-high technology 
manufacturing sector, 0 otherwise 
61404 0.17 0.38 
Medium-low technology 
Dummy=1 if the firm belongs to medium-low technology 
manufacturing sector, 0 otherwise 
61404 0.15 0.35 
High technology services 
Dummy=1 if the firm belongs to high technology services 
sector, 0 otherwise 
61404 0.11 0.31 
Researchers in t-1 
Number of researchers in FTE 61404 2.62 15.24 
Technicians in t-1 
Number of R&D technicians in FTE 61404 2.16 12.01 
Auxiliary staff in t-1 
Number of R&D auxiliary staff in FTE 61404 0.83 4.49 
Madrid  
Dummy=1 if the firm is located in the Region of Madrid, 0 
otherwise 
61404 0.18 0.39 
Catalonia 
Dummy=1  if the firm is located in the Region of Catalonia, 0 
otherwise 61404 0.24 0.43 
Andalusia 
Dummy=1  if the firm is located in the Region of Andalusia, 0 
otherwise 61404 0.06 0.25 
Export Dummy=1 if the firm exports, 0 otherwise 61404 0.60 0.49 
Age Age of the firm in years 61404 24.54 19.77 
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Table A.2. Probit estimations: Predicted probability of receiving an R&D subsidy  
 Total subsidies National subsidies Regional subsidies 
 Coef. Std. Err. z Coef. Std. Err. z Coef. Std. Err. z 
          
National subsidies       -0.080 0.108 -0.740 
Regional subsidies    -0.103 0.086 -1.2    
European subsidies    0.276 0.423 0.65 -0.209 0.430 -0.490 
Total subsidies in t-1 0.666 0.041 16.060*** 0.409 0.081 5.04***  0.685 0.052 13.180*** 
Internal R&D in t-1 0.309 0.050 6.150*** 0.300 0.079 3.82***  0.292 0.059 4.950*** 
Researchers in t-1 -0.015 0.032 -0.480 -0.003 0.032 -0.09 -0.031 0.033 -0.930 
Technicians in t-1 -0.020 0.037 -0.550 -0.015 0.027 -0.58 -0.003 0.052 -0.050 
Auxiliary staff in t-1 0.105 0.063 1.660* 0.012 0.065 0.19 0.180 0.086 2.080** 
R&D cooperation in t-1 0.467 0.047 9.970*** 0.362 0.073 4.95***  0.378 0.057 6.600*** 
Lack of internal funds in t-1 -0.017 0.017 -1.020 -0.014 0.030 -0.46 -0.017 0.022 -0.760 
High technology 0.222 0.188 1.180 0.232 0.339 0.69 0.441 0.269 1.640 
Medium-high technology 0.125 0.054 2.310** 0.158 0.084 1.89* 0.111 0.070 1.600 
Medium-low technology 0.109 0.050 2.160** 0.239 0.088 2.71***  0.149 0.065 2.270** 
High technology services 0.306 0.077 3.970*** 0.222 0.119 1.87* 0.339 0.096 3.540*** 
Patents 0.291 0.141 2.070** 0.314 0.228 1.38 0.324 0.180 1.800* 
Training 0.619 0.129 4.790*** 0.444 0.184 2.41***  0.633 0.176 3.590*** 
Group 0.292 0.054 5.410*** 0.268 0.083 3.25***  0.280 0.080 3.490*** 
International and private 0.175 0.134 1.310 0.076 0.184 0.41 0.395 0.239 1.650* 
Madrid 0.180 0.072 2.490*** 0.103 0.104 0.99 0.190 0.128 1.480 
Catalonia 0.099 0.052 1.900* 0.115 0.081 1.42 0.157 0.081 1.950* 
Andalusia 0.488 0.132 3.690*** 0.513 0.297 1.73* 0.662 0.174 3.800*** 
Export 0.167 0.037 4.500*** 0.049 0.063 0.78 0.170 0.047 3.600*** 
Size non-R&D 0.000 0.000 2.360*** 0.000 0.000 1.41 0.000 0.000 1.110 
Age 0.003 0.002 1.970** 0.006 0.003 2.42***  0.002 0.002 1.150 
Constant 108.115 21.580 5.010*** 92.841 35.775 2.60***  88.033 27.897 3.160*** 
          
 Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 
 0.130 1182.940 0.000 0.07 246.92 0.000 0.130 750.420 0.000 
 N=7350   N=2622   N= 4731   
Note: Probit estimations carried out after the CEM. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table A.3. Subsidies from National and Regional administrations. T-test of difference between means. Treated and control groups after matching  
 
 Total subsidies National subsidies Regional subsidies 
 Mean  T-test Mean  T-test Mean  T-test 
Variable Treated Control % bias t Treated Control % bias t Treated Control % bias t 
National subsidies         0.06 0.06 4.00 0.87 
Regional subsidies     0.28 0.30 -5.50 -0.95     
European subsidies     0.01 0.00 6.90 1.38 0.00 0.00 1.60 0.33 
Total subsidies in t-1 0.50 0.50 0.90 0.26 0.52 0.55 -6.20 -1.15 0.56 0.55 2.80 0.65 
Internal R&D in t-1 0.53 0.54 -1.90 -0.59 0.56 0.56 1.00 0.18 0.57 0.59 -4.10 -0.98 
Researchers in t-1 0.44 0.44 -0.90 -0.25 0.61 0.53 7.60 1.34 0.47 0.48 -1.70 -0.39 
Technicians in t-1 0.24 0.23 1.40 0.35 0.44 0.35 4.80 0.88 0.26 0.24 4.60 1.00 
Auxiliary staff in t-1 0.13 0.11 7.70 2.29 0.18 0.17 1.30 0.23 0.14 0.13 4.60 0.98 
R&D cooperation in t-1 0.26 0.23 8.70 2.45 0.28 0.26 4.60 0.79 0.27 0.24 9.70 2.15 
Lack of internal funds in t-1 1.93 1.93 -0.50 -0.17 1.97 1.94 2.40 0.49 1.89 1.87 1.20 0.32 
High technology 0.01 0.01 1.90 0.57 0.01 0.01 1.70 0.33 0.01 0.01 -3.00 -0.58 
Medium-high technology 0.15 0.15 -1.90 -0.58 0.17 0.18 -3.10 -0.54 0.14 0.15 -1.60 -0.37 
Medium-low technology 0.14 0.15 -2.90 -0.93 0.13 0.12 2.30 0.43 0.14 0.14 -0.40 -0.09 
High technology services 0.07 0.08 -3.20 -0.91 0.08 0.08 1.30 0.24 0.08 0.08 -3.30 -0.73 
Patents 0.02 0.02 1.20 0.33 0.02 0.02 2.70 0.46 0.02 0.02 -1.00 -0.21 
Training 0.02 0.02 1.50 0.43 0.03 0.03 2.70 0.46 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Group 0.14 0.15 -2.80 -0.87 0.19 0.19 -1.30 -0.23 0.11 0.11 -2.00 -0.48 
Foreign 0.02 0.03 -5.50 -1.54 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -2.20 -0.47 
Madrid 0.06 0.06 -1.90 -0.60 0.09 0.09 -0.90 -0.18 0.03 0.03 -1.20 -0.29 
Catalonia 0.13 0.14 -4.40 -1.39 0.17 0.15 3.30 0.64 0.08 0.10 -6.80 -1.56 
Andalusia 0.02 0.02 -4.80 -1.42 0.01 0.01 -2.20 -0.36 0.02 0.02 0.70 0.16 
Export 0.59 0.61 -4.60 -1.52 0.60 0.57 5.70 1.11 0.57 0.60 -4.70 -1.20 
Size non-R&D 94.51 68.92 2.30 1.30 94.36 101.91 -0.60 -0.44 47.77 51.63 -3.10 -0.81 
Age 19.82 19.76 0.50 0.14 20.80 19.66 9.10 1.71 18.58 18.79 -1.90 -0.45 
 Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 Pseudo R2  LR chi2 p>chi2 
 0.005 32.29 0.073 0.008 16.86 0.855 0.005 19.23 0.740 
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Table A.4. Impact of public subsidies on the composition of R&D personnel by occupation 
and level of education. 
 
Total subsidies      




Research personnel  0.69 0.36 0.33***  47.39 55.94 
Technicians  0.51 0.19 0.31***  34.89 30.05 
Auxiliary staff  0.26 0.09 0.17***  17.72 14.01 
Total  1.45 0.64 0.81*** 100.00 100.00 
      
PhDs  0.06 0.04 0.03***  4.24 5.49 
Graduates  0.71 0.27 0.44***  49.12 42.57 
Short cycle tertiary  0.29 0.14 0.15***  19.73 21.23 
Non-university degree  0.39 0.20 0.19***  26.92 30.72 
Total 1.45 0.64 0.81*** 100.00 100.00 
      
National subsidies      
      
Research personnel  0.96 0.41 0.54***  41.72 46.51 
Technicians  0.95 0.33 0.62***  41.49 37.25 
Auxiliary staff  0.38 0.14 0.24***  16.79 16.24 
Total  2.29 0.89 1.40*** 100.00 100.00 
      
PhDs  0.12 0.04 0.08***  5.09 4.61 
Graduates  1.15 0.36 0.79***  50.15 40.91 
Short cycle tertiary  0.46 0.19 0.26***  19.88 21.92 
Non-university degree  0.57 0.29 0.28***  24.88 32.56 
Total 2.29 0.89 1.40*** 100.00 100.00 
      
Regional subsidies      
      
Research personnel  0.62 0.36 0.26***  49.64 51.90 
Technicians  0.41 0.21 0.20***  32.58 29.93 
Auxiliary staff  0.22 0.13 0.10***  17.78 18.17 
Total  1.24 0.69 0.56*** 100.00 100.00 
      
PhDs  0.06 0.03 0.03* 4.44 4.30 
Graduates  0.58 0.29 0.29***  46.27 41.88 
Short cycle tertiary  0.26 0.14 0.12***  21.05 20.64 
Non-university degree  0.35 0.23 0.12***  28.25 33.18 
Total 1.24 0.69 0.56*** 100.00 100.00 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table A.5. Impact of public subsidies on the composition of R&D personnel by occupation 
and level of education in the years t+1 and t+2.  
 
Total subsidies (year t+1) 





Research personnel  0.49 0.36 0.13** 48.65 47.80 
Technicians  0.34 0.27 0.08 34.47 35.72 
Auxiliary staff  0.17 0.12 0.04 16.89 16.48 
Total  1.00 0.75 0.25*** 100.00 100.00 
      
PhDs  0.05 0.02 0.03***  5.33 3.12 
Graduates  0.43 0.31 0.12** 43.43 41.56 
Short cycle tertiary  0.20 0.15 0.05 19.97 19.69 
Non-university degree  0.31 0.27 0.04 31.27 35.63 
Total 1.00 0.75 0.25*** 100.00 100.00 
 
 
Total subsidies (year t+2) 
      
Research personnel  0.39 0.40 -0.01 45.48 50.47 
Technicians  0.31 0.28 0.04 36.97 35.58 
Auxiliary staff  0.15 0.11 0.04 17.55 13.95 
Total  0.85 0.78 0.07 100.00 100.00 
      
PhDs  0.07 0.02 0.04**  7.94 3.17 
Graduates  0.35 0.35 0.00 41.26 44.85 
Short cycle tertiary  0.18 0.18 0.00 20.81 22.44 
Non-university degree  0.26 0.23 0.02 30.00 29.54 
Total 0.85 0.78 0.07 100.00 100.00 






Table A.6. Robustness test 1. Impact of R&D subsidie . Subsidies from any public 
administration 
  Total 
Variable Difference T-stat 
Total R&D expenditures 69858.65 3.27***  
Private R&D expenditures 61581.91 2.52***  
Internal R&D expenditures  55345.76 3.37***  
Total personnel in R&D 0.70 5.00***  
Research personnel  0.35 5.39***  
Technicians  0.22 2.94***  
Auxiliary staff  0.12 2.87***  
PhDs  0.04 3.43***  
Graduates  0.36 4.32***  
Short cycle tertiary  0.14 3.78***  
Non-university degree  0.15 2.80***  
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. R&D expenditures are 
expressed in Euros and personnel in FTE. The matching procedures, CEM and PSM, are not restricted to 
firms in the same year and include all the observations from the different years of the sample.    
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Table A.7. Robustness test 2. Difference in differences estimation  












Technicians Auxiliary  
staff 





            
Treatment 0.288*** 0.101*** 0.237*** 1.064*** 0.608*** 0.288** 0.168*** 0.033** 0.451*** 0.222*** 0.35 9*** 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.021) (0.134)    (0.054) (0.098) (0.037) (0.012) (0.090) (0.038) (0.046) 
N. obs. 15463 12385 14138 42464 42464 42464 42464 42464 42464 42464 42464 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.  ***, **, and * enote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The sample includes only observations f r which R&D 
subsidies in t-1=0. Estimates were obtained using the Fixed Effects method. R&D expenditure variables are in logarithms. In addition to the treatment, the following variables are 
used as controls: R&D cooperation (t-1), lack of inter al funds (t-1), patents, training, number of non-R&D employees (in logs), age (in logs) and year.  
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Table A.8. Robustness test 3 (Placebo test): Impact of R&D subsidies on non-R&D 
employment. Subsidies from any public administration 
 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
Size non-R&D Unmatched 151.94 131.58 20.35 40.02 0.51 
 ATT 151.94 170.73 -18.79 59.15 -0.32 
 
 
 
